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MEMORANDUM

From: Director of Naval Intelligence.
To: Director of Central Intelligence.
(Attn: O/NE).

Subj: ONI Contributions to NIE-32.

Ref: (a) Terms of reference, NIE-32, dated 23 Feb 1951.

1. Subject contributions to indicated paragraphs of the reference are submitted below:

I., B. Estimated losses

Chinese Communist

Chinese Communist naval forces are not known to have suffered any losses in Korea.

North Korean

Recorded losses for the North Korean Navy include 17 vessels of various types. Because some of these were sunk from the air, however, positive identification has been impossible. It is probable that other unreported losses have occurred.

North Korean Marines and units referred to as "Naval Cadets" were committed to ground combat and are estimated to have suffered heavy casualties.

I., C. Present Reserve Strength

Chinese Communist

The Chinese Communist Navy is not known to have any reserves of trained manpower in North Korea.

The Chinese Communist Navy is reported to have as high as 60,000 officers and ratings and nearly 10,000 in training.

The Chinese Communist Navy is believed to have approximately 285 ships totalling over 55,000 tons, but most of these are DE's, LST's and smaller patrol vessels and gunboats.

ONI DECLASSIFICATION/RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS ON FILE

☒ CIA has no objection to declass
☐ It contains information of CIA
interest that must remain

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

Op-322N/rwt

Der 32B1/001165

23 FEB 1951

O/NE CIA 820/34

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North Korean

The personnel strength of the North Korean Navy in June 1950 was estimated at 6000. While present strength may remain this high, they are not engaged in normal naval operations. Some navy personnel have been reported employed as ground combat personnel, indicating a possible surplus of trained personnel for current naval needs.

The North Korean Navy is not known to have any trained manpower in Manchuria or China. It is possible, however, that some North Korean ships and personnel may be in Vladivostok.

The North Korean Navy is estimated to have 20-25 small vessels at the present time. These are probably concentrated at Najin, Unggi and Vladivostok. In addition the North Koreans may have requisitioned an unknown number of junks and fishing vessels. There have been reports of North Korean Naval personnel being sent to Vladivostok for submarine training, but so far as is known no submarines have been turned over to North Korean control.

I., D Limitations on Use of this Reserve

In the face of superior UN naval and air strength, there are few opportunities to employ this limited reserve effectively or employ sea transport for other reserves of men or equipment.

I., E Soviet Material Support

The Soviets have supplied the North Korean Navy with mines, torpedoes, and possibly with minesweepers and other small craft. Naval personnel have been trained by Russians and Soviet advisors have been used.

The Soviets have supplied a large training and advisory staff for the Chinese Communist Navy. They may have turned over submarines and other warships to the Chinese Navy, but the rumors of such transfers have not been positively confirmed.

There is believed to have been some supplying of Communist forces in Korea by Soviet Russia through Dairen. No evidence exists of direct shipments on Soviet merchant ships to North Korean ports.

I., F Present Communist Capabilities

It is not believed that the Chinese Communist or the North Korean Navy, operating without Soviet units, could add critically to the Communist

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capabilities for driving the UN from Korea. It is possible that they could supply assorted small craft for amphibious flanking movements on a limited scale.

Neither the Chinese Communist nor the North Korean Navy is at present capable of carrying on a sustained war of attrition against UN forces. It is possible, but unconfirmed, that they have a very few coastal submarines available, but without large-scale aid in ships and skilled personnel from the Soviets they are not considered capable of launching an effective naval campaign of attrition.

II., A. Effects of Korean Campaign on Communist Capabilities

3. From the strictly naval point of view, there have been no known losses in Korea that may have caused cancellation or deferment of possibly planned operations against other areas.

5. It is estimated that Soviet assistance to the Chinese Communist and North Korean navies has not constituted a significant drain on Soviet resources and logistic facilities. Mines which have been expended probably did not represent a large segment of stockpiles and any reductions could be made up by supplies transported from other sectors of the USSR.

II., B. Effects of Continued Chinese-Korean Operations

2. From a naval point of view, continued Chinese-North Korean operations in Korea would not be likely to limit other possibly planned operations. The principal deterrent in this respect would continue to be the presence of the U.S. 7th Fleet.

4. Continued Chinese-North Korean naval operations in Korea on the present scale would not be likely to cause a significant drain on Soviet naval resources. Ships which may be turned over to the Chinese probably will be old types which would not represent a significant loss to the Soviet Pacific Fleet. If the consumption of oil products assumes greater proportions than at present, it might restrict somewhat Soviet naval and other capabilities in the area. However, stockpiles are believed to exist which would cover Soviet armed forces requirements for a considerable time.

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III., E.

2. Military developments in Korea have probably brought closer cooperation between the Soviet and Chinese naval forces and have speeded up the transference of ships to the Chinese Navy. It probably also has resulted in an increase and speed-up of Soviet training of Chinese personnel.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "R. H. Rodgers", is written above the typed name.

R. H. RODGERS,
by direction.

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